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INTRODUCTION
In July 2006, Syracuse University's Transaction Records Access
Clearinghouse (TRAC) released findings announcing that wide
disparities exist in the rate at which United States immigration
judges grant asylum.' TRAC's report triggered a series of reactions
from numerous sources including the government2 and the public,3
while confirming disparities previously noted by the legal commu-
nity.4 Although the study's findings were alarming on their own, the
various reactions have instigated a number of significant ramifica-
tions. Shortly after TRAC's report was released, then-Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales announced that competency tests and
annual performance evaluations would be implemented in the
coming months for each of the nation's immigration judges.5 Absent
from this announcement, however, was any mention of how such a
program would be implemented or by what standards an immigra-
tion judge should and would be evaluated. The announcement also
failed to make mention of possible repercussions for repeated
inappropriate conduct or a disciplinary system to punish offending
judges.
Recognizing that absence, this Note suggests modifications and
additions to Gonzales's proposed changes. Part I outlines the history
and current organization of the United States's immigration system
1. See TRAC Immigration Report, Immigration Judges, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/160 [hereinafter TRAC Immigration Judges] (last visited Nov. 25, 2007); see also
Rachel L. Swarns, Study Finds Disparities in Judges'Asylum Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
2006, at Al5.
2. See, e.g., Human Rights First, DOJAnnounces Immigration Court Reforms, Aug. 11,
2006, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2007); see
also infra Part III.B.
3. See infra Part III.A.
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines
Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006)
[hereinafter DOJ Press Release], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/
06_ag_520.html; Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Alberto Gonzales to Immigration Judges
(Jan. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Gonzales Memo to IJs], available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.
info/pdf/06202-asy-ag-memo-ijs.pdf; Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Alberto Gonzales to
Members of the Bd. of Immigration Appeals (Jan. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Gonzales Memo to
BIA], available at http://www.human rightsfirst.infopdf/06202-asy-ag-memo-bia.pdf.
1012 [Vol. 49:1011
BIAS ON THE BENCH
and traces the development of the recent problem of disparity in
rulings. Part II discusses highlights from TRAC's findings and
identifies early warning calls sounded by the federal bench, the body
responsible for reviewing immigration appeals. Part III provides a
glimpse into the lives of individual asylum applicants affected by
the disparities, articulates significant public reactions to the TRAC
study, and analyzes the government's position on the problem. Part
IV considers possible organizational changes within the system as
well as the adoption of more stringent qualification requirements for
immigration judges in order to increase the system's effectiveness
and ensure equitable treatment for all.
In the end, although the proposed steps recently outlined by then-
Attorney General Gonzales to address the disparities presented by
TRAC represent a step in the right direction, they simply do not go
far enough. In order to eradicate bias and irrational disparity from
the immigration system, the government must hold immigration
judges to a higher standard and create meaningful consequences for
inappropriate behavior. Specifically, upfront screening of immigra-
tion judge applicants and frequent mandatory cultural sensitivity
training for the entire immigration bench will increase the likeli-
hood that the adjudicators of the American immigration justice
system possess the proper temperament.6 Finally, recent steps
taken by state and national law enforcement agencies to augment
cultural awareness elucidate helpful analogies providing guidance
in determining appropriate avenues for improving the cultural
sensitivity and knowledge of immigration judges. In an ideal
system, individual asylum determinations would be race and color
blind.
6. See Executive Office for Immigration Review, Vacancy Announcement Number:
EOIR-05-0130, http://web.archive.org/web/20070211133013/http://www.usdoj.gov/oarm/jobs/
ijoarmad.htm [hereinafter EOIR Vacancy Announcement] (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (listing
"[d]emonstrates the appropriate temperament to serve as a judge" as a "Quality Ranking
Factor").
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Executive Office of Immigration Courts and the Asylum Process
Systematic regulation of immigration by the federal government
began in 1891, when Congress established the office of Superinten-
dent of Immigration.7 For nearly a century, the nation's immigration
responsibilities bounced between various offices and departments.8
Forty-three years after inheriting the responsibility for federal
immigration functions, the Department of Justice (DOJ) created the
Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) in 1983.' Currently,
all federal immigration courts and the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA)-the office authorized with immigration appellate
authority-reside under the EOIR umbrella.1 °
The Immigration and Nationality Act, which divides immigration
into three general categories, establishes the standards for the
asylum decisions made by members of the EOIR.1' The first two
categories strive to unite families12 and allow immigration on
employment grounds, 3 respectively. The third category encom-
7. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 7, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085.
8. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 8 (2003), available at
http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA 8mgPDF.pdf. Commissioned by the
American Bar Association's Commission on Immigration Policy, Practice and Pro Bono, the
study presents findings regarding the 2002 "Procedural Reforms" at the Board of Immigration
Appeals. The study includes information garnered from interviews with past and present
officials from the Department of Justice, Executive Office of Immigration Review, the Board
of Immigration Appeals, members of court clerk's offices in all federal circuits, and individual
immigration lawyers and groups. Id. at 5.
The nation's immigration functions resided with the Treasury Department from the
program's inception until 1903, when immigration functions moved to the Department of
Labor and Commerce. Id. In 1906, Congress established the Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization within the new Department of Labor and bestowed upon it all immigration
responsibilities until 1940, when Congress moved immigration regulation to the Department
of Justice. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (2006).
12. See § 1l51(b)(2)(A)(i) (exempting immediate relatives of current citizens from
numerous limitations on immigration).
13. See § 1153(b) (providing for the admission of employment-based immigrants).
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passes individuals seeking humanitarian relief, such as political
asylum."
Asylum, loosely defined as legal protection against deportation,
may be gained affirmatively through a U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) officer or defensively through an
immigration judge via a removal hearing. 5 Although their applica-
tions are governed under the same standard, 6 asylum seekers differ
from refugees in that to seek asylum an applicant must already be
in the United States. 7 Defensive asylum cases are heard in
Immigration Court, which falls under the purview of the EOIR.'5
The immigration judges who preside over removal hearings are not
members of the federal judiciary but are employees of the Depart-
ment of Justice. 9 An asylum seeker may enter the defensive process
by referral from the affirmative process, through which he has
already been denied affirmative asylum,20 or by way of either an
14. See § 1158 (outlining specific guidelines for asylum-based immigration); see also § 1157
(providing for the admission of emergency situation refugees).
15. See TRAC Immigration Report, The Asylum Process, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/159 [hereinafter TRAC Asylum Process] (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
16. Press Release, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Asylum
Protection in the United States (Apr. 28, 2005) [hereinafter EOIR News Release], available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/05/AsylumProtectionFactsheetQAAprO5.htm (articulating
five internationally recognized grounds by which an individual may establish credible fear:
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion).
17. TRAC Asylum Process, supra note 15. Provided that they have not been arrested by
the Department of Homeland Security and put into removal proceedings in immigration court,
asylum applicants may file an affirmative petition even if they entered the country illegally.
Id. Typically, the affirmative process is nonadversarial. Almost 251,000 affirmative asylum
cases were filed between 2000 and 2004. Congress is debating proposed changes to the asylum
system that would prohibit people who illegally enter the United States from seeking
affirmative asylum. Id.; see also EOIR News Release, supra note 16 (reporting that
individuals barred from obtaining asylum include those who: have resettled in a country other
than the homeland in which they claim persecution before arriving in the United States; have
participated in the persecution of another person; have been convicted of a serious crime; pose
a danger to United States security; or are members of, or have participated in the activities
of, a foreign terrorist organization).
18. TRAC Asylum Process, supra note 15. If an individual engaged in removal proceedings
expresses a "credible fear" of persecution in his home country, the defensive asylum process
is automatically triggered. Id. A hearing provides such individuals with an opportunity to
defend themselves against removal based on these fears; such hearings are adversarial,
typically involving evidence, exhibits, and witness examination. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (reporting that 71 percent of defensive asylum seekers enter through this referral
process).
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arrest or initiation of expedited removal by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).21
B. The Board of Immigration Appeals
As the highest administrative body in the immigration litigation
system, the BIA has nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals from
immigration judges. 22 As a practical matter, the BIA is the chief
administrative law body for immigration law; it is not a statutory
body, but instead exists only by virtue of the Attorney General's
regulations.23 Tasked with the responsibility of hearing appeals and
issuing decisions in individual cases, the BIA produces both
precedential and nonprecedential opinions.24 In the absence of an
overruling or modification of BIA opinions by the Attorney General,
a federal court, or a later BIA decision,25 precedential BIA opinions
are binding on immigration courts .26 Although the Attorney General
21. Id.
22. DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 8, at 9. In 1922, the Secretary of Labor established
a board to review immigration cases in order to make recommendations to the Secretary
regarding their disposition. Id. at 8. When Congress moved immigration regulation from the
Department of Labor to the DOJ in 1940, this board became the BIA and inherited the
"authority to make final decisions in immigration cases, subject only to possible review by the
Attorney General." Id.
23. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. pt. 3; Dep't of Justice Order No. 174-59, § 19, 25 Fed. Reg. 2460
(Mar. 28, 1960)).
24. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL 1-2 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/vlllqapracmanuallpracmanuallchapl.pdf. See generally DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note
8, at 8-9 (presenting findings regarding immediate adverse ramifications of the BIA,
"Procedural Reforms" instituted under Attorney General John Ashcroft, and predicting that
"the adverse impacts, particularly on aliens and on the federal courts, will worsen, not
improve, as additional time passes"); Jessica R. Hertz, Comment, Appellate Jurisdiction Over
the Board of Immigration Appeals's Affirmance Without Opinion Procedure, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
1019, 1019 (2006) (discussing the federal circuit split on the authority of courts to review a
BIA Affirmance Without Opinion).
25. DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 8, at 11 ("BIA decisions can be modified or overruled
by subsequent BIA decisions, by the Attorney General, or by the federal courts.").
26. Susan Burkhardt, The Contours of Conformity: Behavioral Decision Theory and the
Pitfalls of the 2002 Reforms of Immigration Procedures, 19 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 44 (2004)
(referencing DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 8, at 8, 11); see also DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra
note 8, at 10-11 ("BIA decisions bind all ... Immigration Judges who administer the
Immigration and Naturalization Act. Selected decisions may be designated by a majority vote
of the permanent BIA members as precedents to be followed in future proceedings." (citations
omitted)).
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possesses the authority to review individual cases after they pass
through the Immigration Courts and BIA, the Attorney General
rarely exercises that power.27 Consequently, BIA decisions typically
represent the final decree on a particular case by an administrative
body.28
C. Changes Under Ashcroft
In February 2002,29 then-Attorney General John Ashcroft
announced plans to streamline BIA reviews of immigration
decisions in order to reduce an increasing backlog of cases.3" These
changes essentially reversed the course set by the previous attempts
at streamlining.31 Prior to the 2002 changes, most immigration
appeals to the BIA were reviewed by three-judge panels, which
typically issued written opinions.3 2 "[T]he BIA itself considered 'the
deliberative process available through three-Member review' to be
essential."33 Consequently, prior to the 2002 changes, single-member
dispositions were the exception rather than the norm,34 and "[tlhe
27. Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 43-44.
28. Id. at 43.
29. Although announced in February, the "Procedural Reforms" were not implemented
until September 25, 2002. Id. at 45.
30. Eleanor Acer & Anwen Hughes, The Post-September 11 Asylum System, 32 LITIG. 41,
43 (2006). Between 1992 and 2000, the number of appeals filed with the BIA doubled.
Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 44. Eventually, the number of appeals pending was more than
the BIA could handle and a backlog developed. Id. Growing steadily from 20,000 in 1992, the
backlog reached a staggering 60,000 cases by 2000. Id. In an attempt to decrease this backlog,
changes were made to BIA procedures in 1995. Most significantly, the size of the Board grew
from five members to twelve. Id. at 44-45. By 2002, before the Ashcroft changes, the number
of BIA members had grown to twenty-three. Id. at 45.
31. Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 45.
32. Acer & Hughes, supra note 30, at 43; see also Memorandum from Paul W. Schmidt,
Chairman of the BIA, to all BIA Members 3 (Aug. 28, 2000), reprinted in DORSEY & WHITNEY,
supra note 8, at 3 [hereinafter Schmidt Memorandum] (outlining the plan for a pilot program
aimed at streamlining BIA appeals, which predated the changes implemented under
Ashcroft).
33. DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 8, at 9 (quoting Schmidt Memorandum, supra note
32, at 3).
34. See Schmidt Memorandum, supra note 32, at 2-3. In outlining the categories of cases
that may be affirmed without opinion, dismissed summarily, as well as categories of cases
involving "other procedural and ministerial issues" appropriate for review and disposition by
a single Board Member, Schmidt emphasized that "not every case in a category will be
suitable for streamlining. When in doubt, the best practice is to refer the case for three-
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BIA issued a written decision that was supposed to discuss the
evidence and the reasons for [its] determination sufficiently so that
a reviewing court would know its basis."35 Ashcroft's changes,
however, reversed course, requiring review by a single BIA member
in most cases36 and instructing an increase in one-sentence sum-
mary orders.37 In March 2002, the DOJ issued a memorandum
authorizing summary affirmance by a single Board member for a
much broader category of cases than had ever been subject to the
practice before.3" A few months later, in May 2002, the DOJ changed
its mind and announced that it was abolishing the list of categories
eligible for single-member review and instead authorized:
[S]ummary affirmation by single Board members for "all cases
involving appeals of [immigration judge] decisions over which
the Board of Immigration Appeals has jurisdiction and which
meet the [regulatory] criteria" for affirmance without opinion
and "all cases involving appeals of Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service decisions over which the Board of Immigration
Appeals has jurisdiction and which meet the [regulatory]
criteria" for affirmance without opinion.39
This seemingly minor change made affirmances without opinion the
rule rather than the exception.4 ° Significantly, the absence of an
opinion leaves asylum applicants who are facing deportation
unconvinced that the BIA actually considered their plight and
federal appellate jurists without any legal reasoning to review when
the affirmance comes before their bench.41
Member review." Id. at 1-2.
35. DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 8, at 10.
36. See Acer & Hughes, supra note 30, at 43; Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 47 (noting that
the 2002 Procedural Reforms "dramatically expanded this summary form of review").
37. Acer & Hughes, supra note 30, at 43; Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 49.
38. The categories eligible for review by a single BIA member in March 2002 included
entire ranges of cases, irrespective of "the type or complexity of the factual or legal issues
presented therein." Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 47.
39. Id. at 47-48 (quoting DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 8, at app. 23).
40. Id. at 49.
41. See Letter from Deepa Iyer, Esq., Executive Dir., S. Asian Am. Leaders for Tomorrow
(SAALT), and C. Felix Amerasinghe, Esq., SAALT Policy Action Taskforce, to Hon. Paul J.
McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., and Hon. Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Associate Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice 4 (Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://www.saalt.orgpdfs/SAALTLetter_
ImmigrationCourts.pdf [hereinafter SAALT letter] ("Through summary affirmances, the BIA
1018 [Vol. 49:1011
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This implementation is also significant because it reversed the
assumption, present in the system before May 2002, that doubtful
cases would undergo review by a three-member panel.42 Under the
current system, single-member review is now required in all but six
types of cases.43
Logically, the rate at which cases before the BIA are decided, as
well as the number of summary decisions, has increased radically."
Additionally, the 2002 procedural reforms reduced the BIA's "scope
of review," resulting in fewer cases meeting the eligibility require-
ments for any consideration by the Board.4" The BIA is now more
likely to dispose of the cases that it does hear without opinion.46
Before the 2002 changes, the BIA issued written decisions in most
has endorsed the logical fallacies, prejudices and unsupported conclusions in immigration
judges decisions." (citing Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing
opinions from various federal circuits criticizing the reasoning and conclusions of IJs and the
BIA))).
42. See Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 48; see also Dory Mitros Durham, Note, The Once
and Future Judge: The Rise and Fall (And Rise?) of Independence in U.S. Immigration Courts,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 683 (2006).
43. Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 48. Incoming cases are screened for the six criteria listed
in the federal regulation governing the organization and jurisdiction of the BIA, any one of
which requires that the case undergo review by a three-member panel. Id. Cases may be
assigned to a three-member panel only if the case presents one of the following circumstances:
(i) The need to settle inconsistencies among the rulings of different immigration
judges;
(ii) The need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws,
regulations, or procedures;
(iii) The need to review a decision by an immigration judge or the Service that
is not in conformity with the law or with applicable precedents;
(iv) The need to resolve a case or controversy of major national import;
(v) The need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination by an
immigration judge; or
(vi) The need to reverse the decision of an immigration judge or the Service,
other than one reversed under [8 C.F.R.] § 1003.1(e)(5).
8 C.F.R. 1003.1(e)(6) (2007).
Every case not possessing one of the six criteria is automatically referred to a single BIA
member for her individual review and decision. See Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 48. Once a
BIA member is assigned to review a particular case, she may not refer that case to a three-
person panel unless she believes that the case was improperly referred for single-member
review originally. Id.
44. Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 49. In February 2002, the BIA handed down 3,300
opinions. Id. By August 2002, even before the official procedural reforms implementation, that
number had jumped to more than 5,200. Id.
45. Acer & Hughes, supra note 30, at 43.
46. Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 49.
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cases.4" These opinions discussed both the evidence considered in
and the rationale behind the BIA's decision in order to help federal
appellate courts and the applicant understand how and why the
particular result was reached.48 The 2002 procedural reforms,
however, prohibit BIA members from issuing a written opinion in
cases where they are simply affirming an immigration judge's
decision.49 In such cases, the BIA member does not even have
discretion over the wording of her opinion; that language is dictated
by the procedural reforms.50 The 2002 procedural reforms also
authorized the use of summary decisions for cases meriting remand
and modification.5'
Perhaps most significantly, the 2002 reforms cut in half the
number of BIA members from twenty-three to eleven.5 ' This drastic
reduction affected not only the Board's size, but also had a notice-
able impact on the Board's character.53 Some observers speculate
that changing the Board's character was the reform's primary goal.54
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 49-50.
50. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(B)(ii)(e)(5) (2006) (instructing that orders affirming a decision
below without opinion shall "read as follows: 'The Board affirms, without opinion, the result
of the decision below. The decision below is, therefore, the final agency determination'.... An
order affirming without opinion ... shall not include further explanation or reasoning."
(internal citation omitted)).
51. Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 50.
52. Id. at 51; see also Durham, supra note 42, at 682 (noting that the size of the BIA had
grown from five to twenty-three under Ashcroft's predecessors).
53. Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 51.
54. Id. The former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) General Counsel
declared that "[u]ntil the attorney general discloses his reasons [for letting certain BIA
members go], this has all the appearances of a purge of dedicated civil servants based on a
perception of their policy views." Id. (quoting Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson,
5 on Immigration Board Asked To Leave, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at A16). In other words,
some suspect that then-Attorney General Ashcroft pushed out those who disagreed with the
new round of immigration procedure changes or with the Department of Justice's general
immigration policy. Id.; see also Durham, supra note 42, at 683 (noting that "following the
voluntary retirement of several of the most liberal members of the Board, the five members
selected for 'reassignment' by the Attorney General were those with essentially the most
immigrant-friendly and antiagency decision record[s]" (citation omitted)).
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Taken together, these changes"5 "undermined the ability of
asylum seekers to obtain a full and fair hearing on their claims.""6
Critics of the present system, including members of the federal
circuit courts,17 insist that Ashcroft's changes resulted in mere
"rubber-stamping" by the BIA of denials by immigration judges.5"
The changes made to the BIA procedures and make-up of the
administrative body drastically affected the number of cases filed in
federal court.5 9 Moreover, the change to affirmances without opinion
as the general rule resulted in frustration for federal jurists
reviewing the BIA decisions because no legal reasoning accompa-
nied most of the judgments."0 Although the BIA changes strove to
streamline the process, they backfired, creating more work at the
federal appellate level. Summary decisions from the BIA may move
cases through the BIA more quickly, but they fail to catch instances
of blatant bias or flawed decisions by the immigration judges below.
55. Other changes not discussed at length here include heightened standard of review for
factual findings and credibility determinations, as well as shortened deadlines for disposition
of appeals. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(8) (2006); Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural
Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 50,880, 50,881 (Aug. 26, 2002)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3); Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 50-51.
56. Acer & Hughes, supra note 30, at 43; see also Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 41 (arguing
that changes to procedures governing BIA proceedings "make it much more likely that those
involved in immigration proceedings will not benefit from the fair, unbiased, and thoughtful
consideration their cases deserve").
57. See Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533-35 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing "[a]ffirmances by the
Board of Immigration Appeals either with no opinion or with a very short, unhelpful,
boilerplate opinion" as a recurring "disturbing feature" of immigration appeals before the
Seventh Circuit).
58. Acer & Hughes, supra note 30, at 43. The U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom studied the impact of the changes under Ashcroft on asylum seekers who were
detained upon arrival in the United States. Id. According to the Commission's findings, the
BIA sustained 24 percent of asylum appeals in such cases in 2001. Id. After the 2002 changes
were implemented, that number dropped to 2-4 percent. Id. The Commission pointedly
concluded that, "[sitatistically, it is highly unlikely that any asylum-seeker denied by an
immigration judge will find protection by appealing to the BIA." Id. Consequently, the
Immigration Courts are an applicant's only opportunity to have her claim heard while in the
immigration system. The next meaningful opportunity is the federal circuit courts. Id.; see
also Iao, 400 F.3d at 533-35; Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 68 (predicting that "[t]he
unprecedented expansion of the use of single-member review ... will undermine the quality
of administrative adjudication of immigration cases and increase the propensity of judges to
allow their ideological predilections to determine the results of those cases").
59. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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II. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY REGARDING RULINGS
A. TRAC Findings
The TRAC study examined all recorded asylum cases (nearly
300,000) decided between 1994 and 1999 and between 2000 to the
first few months of 2005.61 This "extensive analysis of how hundreds
of thousands of requests for asylum in the United States have been
handled has documented a great disparity in the rate at which
individual immigration judges declined the applications. 62 The
median "judge-by-judge denial rate" is 65 percent, whereas individ-
ual denial rates ranged from 10 to 98 percent. 63 Eight judges denied
asylum to nine out often applicants who appeared before them, and
two judges granted asylum to nine out of ten of their applicants.64
Ten percent of the immigration judges whose records were studied
denied asylum at least 86 percent of the time, whereas another 10
percent denied asylum in only 34 percent of their cases.65 Miami
Immigration Judge Mahlon F. Hanson's denial rate was the highest
at 96.7 percent of 1,118 cases before him in which the applicant had
legal representation. 6 On the other end of the spectrum, Judge
Margaret McManus of New York denied only 9.8 percent of the
1,638 represented cases before her.6 v
61. TRAC Immigration Judges, supra note 1. The study broke the time period examined
into two five-year blocks (1994-99 and 2000-2005) because significant changes occurred in
immigration law over the course of the entire period, requiring different analysis of the post-
2000 data. Id. Despite these substantive law changes and changes in the immigration court's
makeup, "the findings about the disparity in the two periods were surprisingly consistent."
Id.
62. Id. The data about individual judges was collected from a variety of sources over
several years by the EOIR. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Judge Hanson joined the immigration bench in 1995 after a legal career that
included almost a decade in the then-existing U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS). Id.; see also TRAC Immigration Report, Judge Mahlon F. Nelson, http://trac.syr.edul
immigration/reports/judgereports/116/index.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
67. TRAC Immigration Judges, supra note 1. Appointed in 1991, Judge McManus spent
five years as a staff attorney with Legal Aid Society's Immigration Unit. Id.; see also TRAC
Immigration Report, Judge Margaret McManus, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/
judgereports/149/index.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
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TRAC's findings confirmed what many federal jurists, asylum
lawyers, and system observers already suspected: immigration
decisions under the EOIR and the BIA vary widely and arbitrarily.
Although TRAC's study presented all the evidence together
conclusively for the first time, individual warning signs already had
suggested that a problem existed.
B. Federal Courts Sound Early Warning Calls
Appeals from BIA decisions are most typically made to a federal
circuit court" via a petition for review." Asylum applicants unable
to attain a satisfactory appeal before the BIA are appealing to
federal court in greater numbers after the 2002 changes to BIA
procedures.7" Three percent of all appeals filed in federal court
during 2001 were BIA decision appeals.71 By 2004, that number had
jumped to 25 percent.7 2 Moreover, some commentators estimate that
"[t]he number of federal court cases reviewing removal orders has
increased 970% in the past ten years., 73 For example, the Sixth
Circuit saw an increase in immigration appeals from 1,642 cases in
68. Appeals may also be made to a federal district court under a writ of habeas corpus. See
Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 44.
69. Id. On April 3, 2006, Judge John M. Walker, Chief Judge of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee to express his view regarding
a proposal to the Committee that all immigration appeals be consolidated under the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.
gov/print testimony.cfm?id=1845&witid=5214 [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Hon. John
M. Walker, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit). Judge Walker
began his remarks with a brief overview of the immigration litigation system, explaining that
if an asylum applicant is ordered deported by an immigration judge, and that order is affirmed
by the BIA, the applicant may seek further review in the federal court of appeals within
whose jurisdiction the immigration judge's decision was rendered. Id.; see also Senate
Considers Immigration Litigation Reform, THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 2006, http://www.
uscourts.gov/ttb/04-06/immigration/index.html.
70. Acer & Hughes, supra note 30, at 43.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial
Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 39 (2007) ("As of September 2005, ... immigration cases represented
18% of the appellate civil docket." (citation omitted)).
73. Benson, supra note 72, at 39 (citing Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum, Non-Citizens Access the
Federal Courts: How Demand for Review Exceeds Statutory Restrictions, Master Trends in
the Law 12 (Jan. 28, 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the New York Law School Law
Review)).
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2001 to 11,366 cases in 2004, a 592 percent increase.74 In the Second
Circuit, immigration appeals now account for nearly 50 percent of
all filings received annually."s
The exponential increase in immigration cases has not gone
unnoticed by federal judiciary members, several of whom have
repeatedly expressed frustration and disappointment over the
immigration system's current state. The opportunity for meaningful
administrative review has deteriorated to the point where the
circuit courts now represent the first line of defense against
mistaken or biased immigration judge decisions.76 Not only are
circuit court judges displeased about the backlog of immigration
cases now before them, but some federal judges lament the quality
of the opinions coming out of the immigration courts.77
Criticism of immigration judges and BIA members by the federal
judiciary has become increasingly severe. Judge Richard Posner
displayed particular displeasure with the administrative immigra-
tion system in his Benslimane opinion.7" Specifically, he noted that
in 2005, 40 percent of 136 opinions decided on the merits by
immigration courts and affirmed by the BIA were reversed by the
Seventh Circuit."9 In comparison, the circuit's reversal rate for civil
cases in which the United States was the appellee was only 18
percent during this period.8 ° Additionally, Judge Posner cited twelve
cases in which other federal appellate panels sharply critiqued the
74. Acer & Hughes, supra note 30, at 43.
75. Hearing, supra note 69. In October 2005, Judge Jon 0. Newman spearheaded an effort
by the Second Circuit to create a Non-Argument Calendar (NAC) for asylum cases. Id.
Running parallel to the Regular Argument Calendar, the NAC is expected to eliminate the
Second Circuit's backlog of asylum cases in roughly four years. Id. Under the NAC, forty-eight
asylum cases are heard every week, and a three-judge panel reviews each case. Id.
76. Id.; see Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005). Judge Posner
lamented that "different panels of this court reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals in
whole or part in a staggering 40 percent of the 136 petitions to review the Board that were
resolved on the merits." Id.
77. See, e.g., Huangv. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142, 143 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding asylum case
for reconsideration by a different immigration judge due to the appearance that the first could
not impartially adjudicate the case); Wang v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 261 (3d Cir.
2005) (finding that the immigration judge had failed the "basic requirement" of neutrality).
78. Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 829-30 (declaring that the adjudication of immigration cases
at the administrative level "has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice").
79. Id. at 829.
80. Id.
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judgment and competence of immigration judges and the BIA.8'
Nearly every case Posner cited highlighted bias, hostility, or abusive
conduct by immigration judges towards asylum applicants.8 2
Although refraining from speculation as to the reason for substan-
dard performance, Judge Posner pointedly noted that this was not
a new problem.83
The Third Circuit's Judge Fuentes made similar observations in
a 2005 opinion, which remanded an asylum case for reconsideration
by a different immigration judge. 4 In his opinion, Judge Fuentes
reproduced a line of questioning by the original immigration judge
directed at the asylum applicant, noting that the questions
"preshadowed her hostile attitude towards him and his claims."8 5
The opinion also emphasized that the immigration judge's oral
opinion was "consistent in tone and substance with her comments
during the ... hearing."8 Mr. Wang, the asylum applicant, appealed
the immigration judge's decision to the BIA, which affirmed in a
one-paragraph opinion that failed to address the inappropriate
language, tone, or attitude of the immigration judge below.87
The Third Circuit did not mince words in its analysis of the
evidence of bias. Expressing dismay at a "disturbing pattern"8 of
inappropriate conduct by immigration judges, Judge Fuentes
declared that:
Time and time again, we have cautioned immigration judges
against making intemperate or humiliating remarks during
immigration proceedings. Three times this year we have had to
admonish immigration judges who failed to treat the asylum
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 830 ("Whether this is due to resource constraints or to other circumstances ...
we do not know, though we note that the problem is not of recent origin.").
84. Wang v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 260 (3d Cir. 2005).
85. Id. at 262.
86. Id. at 265.
87. Id. at 266. Judge Fuentes explained that the Third Circuit would review the
immigration judge's decision because "[w]here an opinion issued by the BIA essentially adopts
the opinion of the IJ, we review the latter." Id. at 267.
88. Id. at 268 (citing opinions by sister circuits regarding inappropriate conduct by
immigration judges).
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applicants in their court with the appropriate respect and
consideration."9
Other circuits reviewing similar BIA affirmances echoed the Wang
panel's frustration with immigration judges' flagrantly inappropri-
ate reasoning in written opinions and disrespectful comments made
during asylum hearings.9 °
In June 2006, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Newman, found that the immigration judge's bias against the
applicant mandated a remand to the BIA and reassignment to a
different immigration judge if further fact finding was warranted.91
After reproducing problematic portions of the asylum hearing and
the immigration judge's written opinion, Judge Newman noted that
this was not the first instance of bias by Immigration Judge Chase.92
Citing a laundry list of cases in which the immigration judge's
conduct had been inappropriate, Judge Newman stated that "such
displays of hostility and apparent bias" required remedial action.93
The only remedial action available to a federal circuit court
reviewing an asylum decision, however, is remand with the strong
89. Id. at 267. In Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), a Third Circuit panel
noted that the immigration judge had "search[ed] for ways to undermine and belittle" the
applicant's testimony. Id. at 159. The adjectives used by the court in Fiadjoe v. Attorney
General, 411 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2005), to describe an immigration judge's opinion included
"crude," "cruel," "hostile," "extraordinarily abusive," and "extreme[ly] insensitiv[e]." Id. at 144,
146, 154, 155. In Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2005), the case was remanded
for reassignment to a different immigration judge because the court found the first to have
exhibited "extreme hostility" toward the applicant. Id. at 287.
90. See, e.g., Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2007) ("In our view, the IJ's
assessment ... contained commentary ... that suggests the IJ may not have acted as a neutral
arbiter."); Floroiu v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that the IJ's labeling
of the asylum applicants as "religious 'zealots' whose exercise of religion was 'offensive to the
majority"' tainted the proceedings, ended the appearance of fairness, and resulted in a denial
of due process) ("We find it ironic that the IJ-who is charged with protecting asylum
applicants from religious persecution in their countries of origin-spoke in the unacceptable
language of religious intolerance."); Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2006) (vacating
and remanding a denial of asylum decision because IJ Chase "repeatedly addressed [the
applicant] in an argumentative, sarcastic, impolite, and overly hostile manner that went
beyond fact-finding and questioning').
91. Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142, 151 (2d Cir. 2006).
92. Id. at 150 ("[T]he conduct of IJ Chase has raised substantial questions as to his
apparent bias against and hostility toward ... petitioner." (citations omitted)).
93. Id.
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recommendation that the case not return to the original immigra-
tion judge.94
Federal appellate panels appear to be making the recommenda-
tion that remanded cases be reassigned with increasing frequency.95
In at least once case, a Seventh Circuit panel even went so far as to
direct the court's clerk to send a copy of the panel's opinion to the
Attorney General of the United States so that agency disciplinary
action against the IJ could be considered. The panel noted that this
opinion represented the second time that it had been forced to
reprimand the particular IJ for employing "unsupported speculation
about an asylum applicant" in his asylum denials.96
Although certainly not an ideal system for the long term, the
EOIR could utilize opinions by the federal bench chastising
intemperate or biased behavior by IJs as a means of identifying
problem IJs who may be in urgent need of review, official repri-
mand, or even removal.97 Ideally, the EOIR and BIA will implement
a system of evaluating IJs and identifying red flags that does not
need to involve the federal bench at all, thereby reducing the
backlog of immigration cases in federal court.9"
III. REACTIONS TO TRAC's FINDINGS
A. The Public Reacts: Giving a Face to a Number
If proliferation of news articles is an accurate gauge of public
interest, TRAC's findings certainly piqued the American public's
94. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16
(2002) ("[Ihe proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation.").
95. Floroiu, 481 F.3d at 976.
96. Id.
97. In September 2007, the New York Times published an article highlighting a Second
Circuit panel opinion rebuking an IJ for exhibiting inappropriate behavior towards an asylum
applicant before her. Nina Bernstein, Judge Who Chastised Weeping Asylum Seeker Is Taken
Off Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2007, at Bi. The federal panel further instructed that the IJ
be removed from the case. See id. The article also reported that Jeffrey Chase, a New York
immigration judge, had been "relieved of court duties ... and assigned to a desk job after he
was repeatedly rebuked by federal appeals judges for his hostile questioning of asylum
seekers." Id. See supra note 92 and accompanying text for previous criticism of IJ Chase by
federal judges.
98. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
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interest. Released on July 30, 2006, the study attracted the
immediate attention of many major media outlets. Beginning on
July 31, headlines across the nation blared the news of the dispari-
ties in the rulings.99 While some articles focused on the question of
whether an applicant had a lawyer impacted the asylum decision, 00
others insinuated that the biases of individual judges accounted for
the discrepancies.01 The New York Times ran an article on July 31,
the day after the study's release,'0 2 emphasizing the importance of
the impartiality of immigration judges. The article provided specific
99. Interestingly, many newspapers awarded the study coveted space on the front page
or in their beginning sections. See, e.g., Pamela A. MacLean, Wide Disparities Are Found in
Granting Asylum, Lawyerless Applicants Denied 93% of the Time, 28 NAT'L L.J. 5, Aug. 14,
2006 [hereinafter MacLean, Wide Disparities]; Nina Bernstein, New York's Immigration
Courts Lurch Under a Growing Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at Al; Suzanne Gamboa,
Chance of Gaining Asylum Depends on Who's the Judge, SEATTLE TIMES, July 31, 2006, at A4;
Vanessa Hua, Judges Deny Asylum at Widely Varying Rates: Report Says Success of
Application May Depend Largely on Who Hears the Case, S.F. CHRON., July 31, 2006, at A3;
Immigration Crapshoot, CONN. L. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2006, at 4; Steve Lash, Chances on Asylum
Depend on Judge: Report, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 1, 2006, at 1; Pamela A. MacLean, Judges
All Over the Board in Asylum Cases, Study Finds, RECORDER, Aug. 18, 2006, at 3; Eunice
Moscoso, Asylum Requests Judged Inconsistently, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 31, 2006, at A3;
Harvey Rice, Houston Judges Are More Even on Asylum, Huge Disparity in Immigration Cases
Elsewhere Seen as Problem of Fairness, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 1, 2006, at Bi; Elaine
Silverstrini, Study Finds Large Discrepancies, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 8, 2006, at 1; Study Finds
Disparities in Judges'Asylum Rulings, CHI. TRIB., July 31, 2006, at 6; Swarns, supra note 1,
at A15; Rachel L. Swarns, Study Finds Significant Variations in Granting of Asylum by
Immigration Courts, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 1, 2006, at 8.
100. See, e.g., Immigration Crapshoot, supra note 99 (reporting that applicants without
representation were denied 93 percent of the time while applicants with lawyers were
denied 64 percent of the time); Pamela A. MacLean, Want Asylum? Better Get a Lawyer, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 17, 2006, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir//press/06/NLJWantAsylum.pdf;
MacLean, Wide Disparities, supra note 99. Most asylum seekers lack the financial resources
to pay an attorney and are forced to proceed through the system unrepresented. Acer &
Hughes, supra note 30, at 41. A few may be able to secure representation through a faith- or
community-based program or find a pro bono attorney willing to take their case. Id. A study
conducted by Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of International Migration
found that more than one-third of asylum applicants are unrepresented. Id. at 41, 44
("Asylum seekers are up to six times more likely to be granted asylum when they are
represented.").
101. See, e.g., Gamboa, supra note 99; Hua, supra note 99; Lash, supra note 99; Moscoso,
supra note 99; see also Immigration Crapshoot, supra note 99 (using the track records of
individual judges to highlight the wide range of the disparities: Miami Judge Mahlon F.
Hanson granted a record low of 3 percent of asylum cases and New York Judge Terry Bain
granted a high of 89 percent). The article also notes that the disparities vary widely within
individual regions: Judge Bain's record was compared to fellow New York Judge Alan
Vomacka's 96 percent denial rate. Id.
102. Swarns, supra note 1.
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numbers and statistics from the TRAC study and posited that the
system lacked a "commitment to providing a uniform application of
the nation's immigration laws in all cases."''
The second wave of newspaper articles regarding the TRAC
findings were much more personal. Rather than spouting statistics
and numbers, these articles focused on specific families and
community members who had crossed paths with the immigration
system."0 4 These stories brought the practical reality of TRAC's cold,
hard numbers into a new light.
For example, the Bucks County Courier Times ran a weeklong
series of stories about local families trapped in the web of the
immigration system.10 Arguing that the United States, "[a]s a land
of immigrants,"' ' should provide illegal residents the opportunity
to try to gain citizenship, the series focused on the Musaka family,
who fled Albania in 1999 in order to escape brutal persecution by
communists seeking to reestablish power.'0 7 Husband Lulezim had
already been savagely beaten by the communists by the time the
family was able to save the $23,000 necessary to escape to the
United States.' 8 Settling in a Michigan town among friends from
their Albanian village, the Musakas quickly applied for asylum less
than three weeks after arriving in the United States."0 9 Three years,
an asylum denial, and one failed appeal later, the family fled to
103. Id. (quoting TRAC's co-director, David Burnham).
104. The New York Times has been especially prolific in printing articles regarding the
TRAC study and its aftermath, perhaps in part because one of the nation's largest
immigration courts sits in lower Manhattan. An article by Nina Bernstein traces the history
of Chinese immigrant Meizi Liu's asylum application through the immigration system.
Bernstein, supra note 99. Liu petitioned a New York immigration judge for asylum after being
forcibly sterilized in China. Id. During Liu's asylum hearing, Judge Chase, who had won
awards for his human rights advocacy before ascending to the bench, accused her of lying and
"ridiculed her story." Id. Despite his accusations, Judge Chase offered to grant her application
if Liu would "admit to lying." Id. She refused and her application was denied. Id. In a curt
opinion, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied Liu's appeal of the denial. Id. The Second
Circuit remanded Liu's case to the New York Immigration Court in February, nearly three
years after her original appearance before Judge Chase. Id. Ms. Liu continues to wait for a
new hearing and does not yet know which of the New York Court's twenty-seven immigration
judges will decide her fate this time. Id.
105. See, e.g., Barbara J. Isenberg, An Albanian Family Who Has Tried Legal Channels To
Stay in America Still Faces Deportation, BUCKS COUNTY COURIER TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at Al.
106. Editorial, Illegal Immigrants, BUCKS COUNTY COURIER TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at A6.
107. Isenberg, supra note 105.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Pennsylvania in order to escape a deportation order."' After
remaining under the radar for more than two years in Bucks County
and working hard to support his family, Lulezim was discovered in
2006 and deported, leaving behind a pregnant wife and two small
girls."' According to the article, the TRAC study reported that more
than 50 percent of the 6,154 Albanians who filed applications
between 2000 and 2005 were granted asylum." 2 Vjollca Musaka's
brother was granted asylum in Miami in 2001 on the same grounds
on which the Musakas had lost in Michigan." 3 Vjollca insists that
she knows of other people from her small Albanian village who fled
for the same reasons as her family and were granted asylum in both
Florida and the District of Columbia while her family's applications
were repeatedly denied." 4
Putting stories like the Musaka family's in print alongside
TRAC's numbers brought the human reality of TRAC's findings into
focus. No longer was this an abstract problem difficult to nail down
or easy to ignore. TRAC's statistics suddenly represented real people
with very real lives, with whom many Americans could empathize.
As evidenced by the Bucks County Courier Times article, the effect
of unjust immigration decisions pervades society, even seeping into
small, rural towns.
B. Gonzales Articulates the Federal Government's Position
TRAC's findings likely did not come as a great surprise to the
federal government." 5 Months before the findings were released,
then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales sent separate memoranda
to the members of the Immigration Court" 6 and Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals.1 7 The first two paragraphs of both of the three-
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing TRAC Immigration Judges, supra note 1).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See TRAC Immigration Judges, supra note 1 ('CThe Justice Department ... was
provided a brief summary of some of the [TRAC] report's findings and ... declined to
comment.").
116. Gonzales Memo to IJs, supra note 5.
117. Gonzales Memo to BIA, supra note 5.
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paragraph memoranda are identical." ' Gonzales began each
document by expressing dismay at "reports of immigration judges
who fail to treat aliens ... with appropriate respect and consider-
ation." ' 9 In order to "assess the scope and nature of the problem,"
Gonzales indicated that he had requested that a "comprehensive
review" of the immigration litigation system-including the
Immigration Court and the BIA-be conducted by the Deputy
Attorney General and the Associate Attorney General. 120 According
to the memoranda, the review would examine not only quality of
work but also "the manner in which it is performed." 2' The memo
to the immigration judges closed with a reminder of the unique role
that immigration judges play as "the [first] face of American justice"
that many immigrants see ' as well as an instruction to treat every
individual with "courtesy and respect."'123 The last paragraph of the
memorandum to the BIA emphasized the "critical function" of the
BIA members who review immigration decisions on the Attorney
General's behalf.'24 Although not every immigrant seeking appeal
would be entitled to relief, each case should nevertheless be
"reviewed proficiently.' 2 5
Perhaps, then-Attorney General Gonzales's communication was
inspired by a growing cacophony of complaints about the immigra-
tion system from the print media, as well as a cluster of pointed
decisions from the federal judiciary that came down shortly before
the memoranda appeared.'26 On December 26, 2005, less than two
weeks before the memoranda were released, the New York Times
ran a front-page article detailing concerns by federal court judges
about the immigration courts and the BIA.' 27 Noting that appellate
118. Id.; Gonzales Memo to Us, supra note 5.
119. Gonzales Memo to IJs, supra note 5.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Gonzales Memo to BIA, supra note 5.
125. Id.
126. Acer & Hughes, supra note 30, at 43 (noting the temporal proximity between the
Attorney General's memoranda and a New York Times article relating the concerns of federal
judges with the immigration system after former Attorney General John Ashcroft's tenure);
see also supra Part II.B.
127. Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges' Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
26, 2005, at Al.
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judges from several circuits had "repeatedly excoriated" immigra-
tion judges, the article cited particularly scathing rebukes from the
Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.128 Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Jonathan Cohn defended the immigration courts, insisting
that "the quality of the decisions rendered ... on the whole was good"
and that circuit courts see only a small fraction of the tens of
thousands of cases decided every year by immigration judges.'29
Fast forward several months to the release of the TRAC study: on
August 9, 2006, only days after TRAC's release, the Department of
Justice announced that the immigration courts and BIA would
undergo reforms. 3 ° Interestingly, the DOJ's press release indicated
that the implementation of reforms resulted from "the completion
of a comprehensive review of the Immigration Courts and the Board
that was initiated by the Attorney General in January 2006,
following reports of judges failing to display temperament and
produce work meeting the Department's standards.""' Despite the
temporal proximity to the TRAC study's release, no mention of
TRAC's findings appears anywhere in the press release.
1 2
Although vague on specifics, the reforms will supposedly contain
twenty-two new measures, including: performance evaluations; an
immigration law exam for newly appointed immigration judges and
Board members; a sanction power to be wielded by immigration
judges "for false statements, frivolous behavior and other gross
misconduct"; increased budget resources aimed at bolstering the
number of immigration judges and law clerks and hiring more staff
attorneys for the BIA; technological and support improvements;
improvements to the BIA's "streamlining" practice in order to
"encourage the increased use of one-member written opinions to
address poor or intemperate immigration judge decisions that reach
the correct result but would benefit from discussion or clarification";
a new code of conduct specific to immigration judges and the BIA;
"improved mechanisms to detect poor conduct and quality by
immigration judges"; and a pilot program to assign one or more of
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Gamboa, supra note 99; DOJ Press Release, supra note 5; Human Rights First, supra
note 2.
131. DOJ Press Release, supra note 5.
132. See id.
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the Assistant Chief Immigration Judges to serve closer to the
immigration courts that they oversee.
133
A few of these recommended reforms. merit further discussion.
DOJ's stated goal behind establishing performance evaluations is
"to enable EOIR leadership to review periodically the work and
performance of each immigration judge and member of the Board of
Immigration Appeals."'' Moreover, the evaluations will purportedly
allow for the identification of areas where a particular judge or BIA
member might need improvement, "while fully respecting his or her
role as an adjudicator." '135 According to the Department of Justice,
the EOIR's Director will also conduct an assessment during each
immigration judge's initial two-year trial period "as to whether [the]
new appointee possesses the appropriate judicial temperament and
skills for the job and to take steps to improve that performance if
needed.'1 36 This last component-scrutiny during the trial
period-affects only incoming judges. Although certainly a step in
the right direction towards addressing the problems of bias
apparent from the TRAC findings and the recent federal circuit
opinions, the recommended reform fails to put pressure on the major
offenders of bias: those immigration judges who-although not new
to the system-are simply overworked and jaded.
Similarly, a new immigration law exam, which endeavors to
"ensure that all immigration judges are proficient in the key
principles of immigration law," has only been administered to judges
and BIA members appointed since December 31, 2006.137 Appointees
taking the bench after that date are required to pass the exam in
order to hear and adjudicate cases.'38 Judges appointed to the bench
before December 2006 have no such requirement. Requiring all
immigration judges and BIA members to take and pass the exam,
regardless of how long they have been on the bench, will greatly
increase the potency of this reform measure. Familiarity with key
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Additionally, the required training for immigration judges appointed after
December 2006 includes "mock-hearing and oral-decision exercises." AILA-EOIR Liaison
Meeting Agenda Questions 3 (Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/
statspub/eoiraila041107.pdf.
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principles of immigration law should be a prerequisite for each and
every member of the immigration judiciary, and the more than 200
jurists already on the bench should have to pass the same test in
order to ensure that they possess the requisite skills to effectively
continue in the job.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE SYSTEM
A. Increase the Size of BIA and Number of IJs
Former Attorney General Gonzales's proposed plan simply does
not go far enough to effectuate a meaningful change. His announce-
ment that DOJ will endeavor to increase the number of BIA
members certainly represents a positive step.'39 The increase in the
size of the BIA, however, must entail the addition of more than four
new members in order to effectively facilitate a more in-depth
review of immigration judges' opinions and to allow BIA members
to produce written opinions outlining the rationales behind their
decisions. 4 ° In his testimony before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Second Circuit Chief Judge John Walker noted that
eleven BIA members simply cannot handle the nearly 43,000
petitions for review submitted to the Board each year.' While
applauding the proposal to add four members to the BIA, Judge
Walker cautioned that this addition would not be substantial
enough.' Judge Walker advocated increasing the BIA to thirty
139. See Susan Gamboa, Immigration Courts Get New Rules, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 10, 2006,
at AS (reporting that Gonzales "wants to add four members to the Board of Immigration
Appeals and continue using temporary members as needed").
140. Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 75 (suggesting that the elimination of written decisions
may result in a decrease in the "intellectual rigor in decisionmaking" because BIA members
are not required to collect the facts necessary to the decision (quoting ABA COMM'N ON
IMMIGRATION POUCY, PRACTICE & PRO BONO, SEEKING MEANINGFUL REVIEW: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO DORSEY & WHITNEY STUDY OF BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS PROCEDURAL REFORMS 3 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/
immigration/bia.pd)).
141. See Hearing, supra note 69 (estimating that even under the single-member review
system, each BIA member must decide 4,000 cases a year, or 80 per week, in order to keep up
with the rate of filings).
142. Id. (implying a need for immediate action and suggesting that this step could be
"taken right away at modest cost").
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members, 143 more than twice the size of the current Board and an
increase of seven over the size that the BIA was at its largest in
2002, just before the Ashcroft-implemented changes. Without a
drastic increase in the BIA's size, asylum applicants will continue
to have difficulty attaining meaningful and adequate review of their
applications and appeals to federal court will continue in large
numbers. 144
B. Return to a Policy Where Written BIA Opinions Are the Norm,
Not the Exception
Requiring written opinions from BIA members in all decisions
will provide federal courts with the information they need to
adequately review the petitions before them.145 In order to properly
affirm a BIA decision, a federal court must be in agreement with the
rationale employed by the BIA in reaching its decision. Without the
insight that a written decision provides into the reasoning applied
by the affirming BIA judge, a federal court has no choice but to
remand the case in order to gather more information, even if it is in
agreement with the ultimate outcome reached by the BIA.'46 The
lack of written opinions has resulted in a greater number of cases
being remanded back to the BIA (and sometimes back to immigra-
tion judges),147 a fact that undermines the goal of "streamlining.""14
143. Id.
144. See id. ("Until sufficient numbers of Immigration Judges and BIA members are in
place, the backlog is likely to continue ... to grow, no matter which court is responsible for
deciding petitions for review.").
145. Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 76 (noting that without written opinions, federal courts
performing appellate review will have only the outcome of a decision, not the underlying
rationale supporting it).
146. Id. (arguing that the elimination of written opinions is counterintuitive to the DOJ's
stated goal of increasing efficiency at the BIA level); see also lao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530,
535 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[We are not authorized to affirm unreasoned decisions even when we
understand why they are unreasoned.").
147. See Hearing, supra note 69. Judge Walker testified that a "higher-than-expected
numbero of cases are remanded" by federal appellate courts to the BIA and Immigration
Courts. Id. Specifically, the Second Circuit remands about 20 percent of its immigration cases,
and the Seventh Circuit's remand rate stands at 40 percent. Id.
148. See Burkhardt, supra note 26, at 76.
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C. Provide Cultural Sensitivity and Awareness Training to All
Immigration Judges
The DOJ's proposed reforms include only a brief mention of
"improved training for immigration judges, Board members, and
EOIR staff."'149 The lack of specifics as to what kind of training is
envisioned creates plenty of room for additional suggestions. To be
effective, the training program must, at a minimum, include
cultural sensitivity training for all Js. 5 ° Asylum applicants often
do not speak English, and "their cases often turn in part on
changing political and social conditions around the world."' 1
Cultural disconnects between judge and applicant may account for
a significant number of the outcome discrepancies.
Of course, it is not possible to craft a training program that
incorporates details of every culture with which an immigration
judge may cross paths. Each immigration court could, however,
implement a training program focusing on the cultures that appear
most often before it. 5 2 A program aimed at increasing general
149. DOJ Press Release, supra note 5.
150. In an opinion remanding an asylum case due to a lack of rational analysis, Judge
Posner summarized six recurring "disturbing features" detected by his court in a large
number of the asylum decisions it reviewed; of particular relevance are his observations of"[a]
lack of familiarity [by immigration judges] with relevant foreign cultures ..., [i]nsensitivity to
the possibility of misunderstandings caused by the use of translators of difficult languages,"
and "insensitivity to the difficulty of basing a determination of credibility on the demeanor
of a person from a culture remote from the American." Iao, 400 F.3d at 533-34. The applicant
in lao was Chinese, and Judge Posner specifically pointed out that "[b]ehaviors that in our
culture are considered evidence of unreliability, such as refusing to look a person in the eyes
when he is talking to you, are in Asian cultures a sign of respect." Id.
151. Liptak, supra note 127; see also Tresa Baldas, Waiting for Asylum, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
13, 2006, at 20 (stating that the "turning point" in the successful political asylum case for a
Nicaraguan woman, who was allegedly beaten and raped by her common law husband for
fifteen years before fleeing to the United States, was "the testimony of an expert witness on
Nicaraguan culture who ... painted for the judge a picture of a desperate woman stuck in a
society that condoned abuse and could not protect her"; and indicating that the immigration
judge indicated to counsel after her ruling that she had been planning to deny the asylum
application until she heard the expert's testimony).
152. Miami Immigration Judge Denise Noonan Slavin insinuated that identifying the
culture most relevant in each Immigration Court might not be difficult. Liptak, supra note
127. The New York and Philadelphia courts see a lot of Chinese immigrants; Chicago has a
large number of cases involving Eastern European immigrants; Miami courts get a lot of
Haitians, Colombian and Venezuelan applicants; and California courts have high numbers
of Central and South American applicants. Id. Training programs implemented in each of
those immigration courts could easily be geared toward the relevant predominant culture or
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cultural awareness and improving overall cultural sensitivity could
be implemented in all jurisdictions and supplemented with specially
geared programs catering to the specific needs in each various court
or region.
Moreover, the EOIR already provides some limited cultural
sensitivity training to immigration judges. In his February 2002
testimony before the United States Senate Committee on the
Judiciary regarding the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act,
Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy testified that "Immigra-
tion Judges have been provided books, guidelines and cultural
sensitivity training pertaining to juvenile issues." '153 Because
cultural sensitivity training is already available to immigration
judges, at least in limited circumstances, the EOIR does not have to
incur the expense of identifying a training provider or implementing
a completely new program. Instead, EOIR officials could expand and
build upon the resources already in place.'54 Presumably, the same
organization or individuals who currently provide cultural aware-
ness training for immigration judges dealing with alien juveniles
simply could provide more expansive training on a larger scale.
In the event that the EOIR must start from scratch to design and
implement a cultural awareness training program, other govern-
ment agencies may be able to offer guidance. Specifically, the U.S.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as well as law en-
forcement agencies constitute two government groups implementing
programs to augment employees' cultural awareness and sensitivity,
cultures.
153. Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id
=172&wit id=236 (statement of Mr. Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, Executive
Office of Immigration Review). Creppy also testified that "Immigration Judges are committed
to provide fair hearings for all, not just juveniles, and I encourage the Immigration Judges to
do all that is required to ensure that this occurs." Id. In a memorandum to the immigration
judges outlining guidelines for cases involving unaccompanied alien children, however, Mr.
Creppy gave only passing mention to cultural sensitivity considerations. Memorandum from
the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge to all Immigration Judges 4 (Sept. 16, 2004),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm04/04-07.pdf ("OCIJ [Office of the Chief
Immigration Judge] has provided training to immigration judges on some of these issues and
will continue to do so in the future.").
154. Mr. Creppy's February 2002 comments were coterminous with the introduction of the
streamlining changes implemented by Ashcroft. No information indicating that the
streamlining changes eliminated or affected the cultural sensitivity training referenced by
Creppy, however, has been uncovered to date.
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especially in the wake of post-September 11 tensions. The TSA
provides cultural awareness and sensitivity training to its employ-
ees, in particular with respect to facilitating appropriate interaction
with Muslim travelers generally and during high-volume travel
times.155
Similarly, police officers and law enforcement agents, both on the
national and local levels, have also experienced an increased focus
on bolstering cultural awareness. For example, the police depart-
ment in Dearborn, Michigan, services a community with one of the
largest Arab populations outside the Middle East.156 In response to
this fact, Dearborn police officers must attend cultural diversity
training sessions every year, and the focus of these sessions varies
by different ethnic groups depending on the issues currently facing
the city at the time of training.57 Recognizing that outreach in
immigrant communities is essential to law enforcement, the
Houston Police Department regularly organizes luncheons for local
refugees from Somalia, Sudan, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Cuba, and
the former Soviet Union, populations with which its officers come
into contact most often.5 '
Individual immigration courts nationwide likely interact with
many of the same populations that police departments and immi-
gration enforcement agencies in the same regions encounter.
Consequently, cultural awareness and sensitivity training could
encompass both IJs and law enforcement personnel. Even if IJs and
law enforcement agents must attend separate training for judicial
propriety reasons, training providers likely could consolidate
planning and preparation activities, thereby reducing overall costs.
155. See, e.g., David Shelby, U.S. Airport Security Officers Briefed on Hajj Traditions,
USINFO, Dec. 26,2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y
=2006&m=December&x=20061226172155ndyblehsO.4967768 (reporting that the TSA
provided special training to sensitize 45,000 airport security employees to cultural traditions
of American Muslims in preparation for an anticipated high volume of travel to Saudi Arabia
to participate in the Haji).
156. Carolee Walker, U.S. Police Work To Build Trust with Muslim Populations, USINFO,
Feb. 5,2007, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p--washfile.english&y=2007&m=
February&x=20070205144855bcreklaw0.714657 (estimating that nearly 40,000 Arab
Americans live in the Dearborn region).
157. See id.
158. See id.
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D. Hold Offending IJs Accountable
In June 2007, the EOIR issued a notice proposing newly formu-
lated Codes of Conduct for IJs and members of the BIA.5 9 The
notice indicated that the EOIR sought public comment on the
proposed codes before finalizing publication.' Specifically, Canons
IX and X of the proposed IJ Codes pertain to the issue of maintain-
ing impartiality and exhibiting appropriate behavior and demeanor
towards the parties and lawyers who appear before an IJ. 6' The
commentary following the proposed canons instructs that "[a]n
immigration judge who manifests bias or engages in unprofessional
conduct in any manner during a proceeding may impair the fairness
of the proceeding and may bring into question the impartiality of
the immigration court system."'62 Accordingly, the test for the
appearance of impropriety by an immigration judge is "whether the
conduct would create in the mind of a reasonable person with
knowledge of the relevant facts the belief that the immigration
judge's ability to carry out adjudicatory responsibilities with
integrity, impartiality, and competence has been impaired."'63
Violations of the canons may be a basis for disciplinary action
against an IJ."'
The Chief Immigration Judge is tasked with the responsibility of
supervising and evaluating the performance of all immigration
judges.'65 Included in this duty is the ability to take corrective action
"where indicated."'66 In the event that they become final, the Codes
of Conduct will serve as an effective tool for evaluating IJ conduct
and should be vigorously enforced. A violation of the Codes should
be considered an indication that corrective action is warranted.
Intemperate behavior and display of irrational bias against
applicants by IJs simply should not be tolerated. As recognized by
159. Codes of Conduct for the Immigration Judges and Board Members, 72 Fed. Reg.
35,510 (Dep't of Justice June 28, 2007).
160. Id. As of the publication date of this Note, the final Codes of Conduct had not yet been
released.
161. Id. at 35,511.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.9 (2007).
166. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.9(b) (2007).
2007] 1039
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the proposed commentary, even a few such occurrences jeopardize
the appearance of justice and propriety of the entire immigration
system.167 Although certainly the vast majority of IJs exemplify
model judicial behavior, the system should not tolerate the few who
fail to follow suit.16 Removal from office is always a drastic remedial
measure, but, in order to maintain the integrity of the immigration
system, the office of the Chief Immigration Judge should not shy
away from utilizing the measure. As evidenced by observations and
reprimands by the federal bench, misconduct by IJs, even one-time
offenders, can be shockingly egregious." 9
E. Change Application Requirements for IJ and BIA Vacancies To
Include Familiarity with U.S. Immigration Law
In addition to increased cultural awareness, immigration judges
must possess a substantial familiarity with governing U.S. immigra-
tion law. Requiring IJ applicants to demonstrate at least a working
knowledge of immigration law, as well as providing training to
current IJs regarding new developments in the law, would help
ensure that all judges are keenly aware of the law that they are
applying daily and by which they are affecting many lives.17 °
Currently, applicants to immigration judge vacancies must have an
LL.B. or a J.D. degree; be an active member of the bar in any
jurisdiction; be a U.S. citizen; and have a minimum of seven years'
relevant post-bar admission legal experience.171 Applicants must
167. Codes of Conduct for the Immigration Judges and Board Members, 72 Fed. Reg.
35,510, 35,512-13 (June 28, 2007).
168. EOIR Director Kevin A. Ohlson responded by letter to a New York Times article
reporting that the federal bench had ordered the removal of an IJ from an asylum case
because the IJ had exhibited intemperate behavior towards the applicant, even rebuking him
for crying during his testimony. Letter from Kevin A. Ohlson, Director, EOIR, to Thomas
Fayer, Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, available at http://www.usdoj/gov.eoir/press/
07/Ltrto EdNYTSep07.pdf. Director Ohison noted that the EOIR now is "committed to taking
action to address the problem [of Js who do not meet the standard for judicial
professionalism]." Id. Included in the EOIR's arsenal of tools to combat IJ misconduct are
individualized training, counseling or the imposition of discipline, "to include, if warranted,
removal from the bench." Id.
169. See supra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
170. See SAALT letter, supra note 41, at 6 (calling for more training on changes in case law
and a more diverse pool of immigration judges).
171. EOIR Vacancy Announcement, supra note 6.
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address, in writing, three of five listed topics as part of the applica-
tion.172 "Knowledge of immigration laws and procedures" is the only
one of the five topics that illuminates an applicant's familiarity with
immigration law, and applicants are not required to address it.
173
Furthermore, BIA members should also possess a current and
substantial familiarity with immigration law in order to execute fair
and efficient reviews of IJ decisions. To that end, the persons hired
or promoted to fill the new BIA seats created by then-Attorney
General Gonzales's proposed improvement plan must be required to
demonstrate at least a modicum of past experience working with
immigration law. 1
74
CONCLUSION
Nationwide discrepancies in asylum rulings are symptomatic of
a greater problem in the immigration system: irrational bias.
Several origins for this phenomenon are plausible and each are
likely present in varying degrees: too many asylum applicants and
not enough judges on the Immigration Court and BIA, cultural
disconnects and misunderstandings, and, in some cases, intentional
bias. An effective solution for moving forward and ensuring equality
for asylum seekers must address each of these factors. The Attorney
General must bolster the BIA ranks by more than just four. An
overwhelming number of asylum applicants logically translates into
many appeals, and thus a strong BIA is the only way to handle the
large volume without constantly resorting to the federal bench.
More immigration judges are needed as well in order to allow IJs to
have sufficient time to handle each case fairly.
172. Id.
173. See id. ("Applicants must address at least three of the following factors in narrative
form on a separate sheet of paper: 1) knowledge of immigration laws and procedures; 2)
substantial litigation experience, preferably in a high volume context; 3) experience handling
complex legal issues; 4) experience conducting administrative hearings; and/or 5) knowledge
of judicial practices and procedures.").
174. See Operations of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR): Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(Feb. 2002) (statement of Hon. Lauren R. Mathon, former BIA Member from 1995-2001),
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/udiciary/hju77558.000/ hju77558-j.HTM
(noting that four BIA members appointed between 2000 and 2002 "had no immigration
background or expertise" and required "time to learn a new body of law and become proficient
at their work").
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Additionally, the immigration system must implement a compre-
hensive training program incorporating periodic cultural sensitivity
training for all members.175 A cursory glance at statistics from each
immigration court should provide insight into which cultures or
ethnicities each immigration court interacts with most frequently.
An effective training program would include specific sessions geared
towards educating members of individual immigration courts about
the cultures it sees most often. General training about appropriate
ways to communicate and interact with people from different
cultures would be effective as well.
Finally, disciplinary procedures-with teeth-must be created to
deal with those judges whose bias transcends a lack of cultural
awareness and enters the realm of intentional. The federal courts,
to some extent, have already identified some judges who may need
specific scrutiny. Moving forward, the immigration system cannot
rely on the federal courts to identify its weakest links. There must
be a system created in the BIA for raising a red flag when a certain
judge repeatedly displays biased or inappropriate behavior. A
seat on the immigration bench is a privilege, and those individuals
who consistently demonstrate an inability to exercise respect and
courtesy should have no place among the ranks.
Lindsey R. Vaala*
175. One possible source of current, concise information is the State Department's country
briefs. See U.S. Dep't of State, Countries, http://www.state.gov/countries (last visited Nov. 25,
2007).
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